Internet Censorship in Russia

Freedom House 2022 Russia Ranking

Russian internet censorship refers to the government's efforts to control and restrict the information that Russian citizens can access through the internet. The censorship regime is an example of decentralized control, which can be technically difficult and expensive to execute. Government authorities are less capable of implementing technological censorship measures unilaterally when they do not directly own the networks; instead, they must adopt controls through laws and policies to force the network owners to comply.The Russian government implements this censorship using a variety of means, including blocking websites, banning certain content, and requiring internet service providers to store data on their users' online activities.

While the access to the Internet in Russia is continually growing, where in 2021 an estimated 88.3% of the Russian population was using the internet, the online environment is becoming increasingly more restrictive. In 2022, Russia received a ranking of “not free” for the Internet Freedom Score by Freedom House due to obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights.

History

A Russian man with tape over his mouth saying "No Voice" while protesting the 2010 presidential election

one of the first internet censorship laws was passed in response to a series of large-scale protests from 2011 to 2013 in opposition to the parliamentary election's manipulation known as rokirovka, which involved the switching of positions between President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at the time, where the opposition extensively utilized the internet to rally the public. In response, the state passed a law in 2012 establishing a centralized list of banned websites. The register originally contained websites that offered drugs and child pornography. But less than two years later, in 2014, it was expanded to include websites that encouraged rioting, contained extremist material, or encouraged participation in large-scale public demonstrations.

Policy

Roskomnadzor

Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, or Roskomnadzor, is the primary government agency in Russia that is responsible for overseeing and regulating nationwide Russian Internet censorship that reports directly to the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. Roskomnadzor maintains a singular and centralized Internet blocklist, officially called the Registry of Banned Sites. This registry was implemented in 2008. Although Roskomnadzor maintains the central registry of banned sites, they are not behind the technical implementation of censorship in Russia. Upon the identification of a website with illegal content, Roskomnadzor sends notice to the website’s owner and hosting provider. If the illegal content is not removed within three days, the corresponding site is added to Roskomnadzor’s registry, and all ISPs across Russia are required to block access to websites in this registry. Therefore, the implementation of censorship falls on Russian ISPs.

Yaroyova Law

Yarovaya’s Law of 2016 builds on a law from 2015 that requires "all domestic and foreign internet companies are obliged to ensure the recording, systematization, accumulation, and storage of the personal data of Russian citizens on internal servers." Yarovaya’s Law is a series of provisions claimed to be for "anti-terrorism." With this law, ISP companies must retain all transmitted data, including video, telephone calls, text messages, web traffic, and email for six months as well as their metadata for three years within Russian territory, and the Russian government no longer needs a permit to access this data. They are required to provide any information requested to security services if asked.

The unprecedented data storage requirements have been cited as making the law's implementation both impractical and expensive. Following the law's passing, it was discovered that the necessary equipment for the data storage was non-existent. Putin has therefore requested government contracts from Russian businesses for the necessary hardware and software. The difficulty to comply with this law is said to be a “desired feature” for the government “because they [companies] cannot reasonably comply with all the demands of the Yarovaya package, they become de facto criminals whatever their actions. And that, in turn, gives the Russian state the leverage to extract from them any other concession it desires”.

The Sovereign Internet Law

The Sovereign Internet Law is commonly used to refer to the series of amendments Russia passed to federal law in November 2019. The official goal of the revisions is to protect Russian internet users from external threats. The policy requires internet service providers to participate in the implementation of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) systems or similar technology, as part of a plan to counter perceived threats to national security and stability. The law also establishes a national domain name system (DNS) and a centralized system for managing and registering domain names. Additionally, the law empowers Roskomnadzor to enforce a national blocklist of websites that are deemed illegal or inappropriate.

Implementations

Blocklist

The Russian blocklist is a list of websites that have been banned by the Russian government for containing illegal or inappropriate content. The government has the authority to prohibit access to websites that contain harmful information, including material promoting extremism, terrorism, or child pornography. The list is managed and enforced by the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). This agency has the power to order internet service providers to block access to websites on the list and regularly updates the list as the online landscape evolves. The use of blocklists as a form of censorship is widespread in many countries and is often used to restrict access to information and limit freedom of expression online. However, the Russian blocklist has been criticized for censoring political content and suppressing opposition voices and violating the principles of a free and open internet. The implementation of the Russian blocklist has been criticized for being inconsistent and arbitrary, with many websites being blocked even though they don't contain illegal content. Its efficacy is also limited by the widespread use of VPNs and other circumvention tools that allow users to access blocked websites.

Deep Packet Inspection

The 2019 Sovereign Internet Law in Russia mandates internet service providers (ISPs) to accept and install Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) systems or similar technology as part of the "Technical Means of Countering Threats" equipment. This requires the implementation of "black boxes," which are analytical devices installed at the hubs of ISPs to examine both data packets and the content of online communications. With these black boxes, Roskomnadzor has the power to monitor, filter, and restrict access to specific content on the internet.

Although DPI technology is unable to view the contents of encrypted connections, it can still block requests to websites based on their IP destination. The use of DPI also allows for traffic prioritization and discrimination, which could impact net neutrality if carried out by a government agency. In such a scenario, Roskomnadzor could prioritize trusted connections from entities that comply with regulations while slowing down the traffic speed of unknown or undesirable connections. For example, In March 2021, Roskomnadzor utilized its DPI equipment to slow down the loading speeds of Twitter as a consequence for the social media platform's alleged systematic refusal to comply with the content removal requests made by the Russian government .

As bypassing DPI services and accessing restricted areas of the internet will be extremely difficult without advanced technical skills, the average Russian internet user is likely to be the main target of the widespread implementation of DPI. The law undermines the principles of net neutrality, as it enables the government to prioritize certain types of traffic and restrict access to others. This creates an "asymmetry of blocking effectiveness," where the average user is the main target of the widespread implementation of DPI, while highly skilled users may be able to bypass the system.

National Domain System

The implementation of a Russian National Domain Name System (DNS) involves creating and deploying a national system for managing and registering domain names in Russia. This development is a crucial step in the country's internet infrastructure and is part of a larger initiative to enhance national control and sovereignty over the internet. Currently, the DNS system is managed in a decentralized, redundant, and open manner by more than 1500 instances of 13 root servers. The proposed Russian system would require ISPs to route through a centralized chokepoint, causing a decline in service for users within Russia and posing a threat to internet communication as websites from outside Russia would become inaccessible unless a Russian-only mirror is already available, including popular sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram.

The establishment of a national DNS has raised concerns among proponents of internet freedom who fear that it might be used to limit access to information and suppress online freedom of expression. If the government decides to restrict access to certain websites or online content, the Russian National DNS could be used for censorship. This could be achieved by controlling the domain name registration and management, allowing the government to block or redirect access to specific websites by manipulating user requests, or simply preventing access. The system could also be used to monitor and control online activity, potentially compromising the privacy of internet users. Furthermore, it would undermine the effectiveness of evasion techniques such as VPNs, Tor, and other methods of hiding traffic destinations, including domain fronting.

The implementation of a national DNS system in Russia is challenging because of the country's decentralized internet infrastructure, which requires a lot of coordination and a significant amount of effort. Although Russia claims to have already set up the infrastructure, managed by Roskomnadzor at the Moscow IX, where Russian TLDs are hosted, it is uncertain whether internet service providers have connected to it. Starting in 2019, Russia has been experimenting with technology to separate from the global internet infrastructure in certain regions. The results of these tests are not known due to the secrecy surrounding them. Russian internet researchers Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan predict that by the end of 2021, with advancements in technology since the passage of the sovereign internet law, the Kremlin would have the ability to control 100% of mobile communications and 73% of internet traffic.

VPN and Tor

On November 2017, the Russian government implemented the 276-FZ law that requires all VPN (Virtual Private Network) providers to register with the government. This law effectively prevents proxy services, such as VPNs and anonymizers like Tor or Opera, that can bypass content restrictions and give access to websites that are blocked in Russia. It also makes it illegal for search engines to provide links to such content. The ban applies to both foreign and domestic VPN providers, with some exceptions, like state-owned information systems and private networks. Individuals who use unregistered VPNs can be fined or face other penalties. The ban has been criticized by internet freedom advocates, who argue that it limits free speech and access to information. Despite these criticisms, the ban remains in place and is actively enforced.

Censorship after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Over the past decade, Russia's censorship regime has become more active, but recent events have brought it to public attention. Internet censorship in Russia has intensified since Feb 2022, when the invasion of the neighboring country Ukraine began.

Russian fake news laws

The Russian fake news laws are a set of federal regulations that prohibit the distribution of any material considered "unreliable" by the Russian government. These laws specify the consequences for violating them and give the Rokomendazor the power to shut down online media that do so without a court's authorization. Two additional laws, known as Laws No. 31-FZ and No. 32-FZ, were introduced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on March 4th, 2022. These laws made it a criminal offense to express opposition to the war or to share information about it that is not supported by the Kremlin, including about the actions of the Russian military.

As a result of these laws, many Russian media outlets were unable to cover the invasion. By March 7th, 2022, over 150 journalists had fled Russia after President Putin signed the bill into law. In the following months, virtually all remaining independent media in Russia were shut down by the Roskomnadzor for violating censorship laws, including the liberal radio station Echo of Moscow, which was replaced with the propaganda outlet Radio Sputnik, The TV channel Dozhd, and online publications such as The New Times, The Moscow Times, and Novaya Gazeta. Around 138,000 websites, including social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, have been blocked or shut down under claims of “fake news” and “extremist organization.” Many of the websites that have been blocked have condemned the conflict in Ukraine or called it an invasion or war instead of the Kremlin's preferred term, "special military operation."